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Abstract 
In this analysis, we evaluate the relative pension positions of men and women, under different 
characterisations of their respective working lives and pension designs. We consider both a 
Defined Benefit (DB) and a Defined Contribution (DC) scheme, and a few variants of their 
basic pension formula, each exemplifying a stylised normative framework.  
Not surprisingly, the working career is the most relevant factor in determining the relative 
retirement income of women with respect to men; pension systems can compensate, but only up 
to a point. As for a comparison between DB and DC systems, taken without explicit 
redistributive measures, the latter can fare better than the former in providing a more equal 
distribution of retirement income between men and women, because it removes the greater 
return to steeper earnings profiles, more characteristic of men. The introduction of a minimum 
pension provision in the DB system improves the relative position of women with discontinuous 
or poor careers, while, in DC systems, a formal recognition of women’s care activities through 
pension credits seems less effective than neutralising their longer life expectancy in the 
determination of the pension benefits using unisex longevity tables.  
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ENEPRI Research Report No. 59/August 2008 
Michele Belloni and Elsa Fornero, 
with the research assistance of Alessandro Manello 
1.  Aim and background issues  
It is a known fact that in many European countries women still experience disadvantage with 
respect to men in the labour market, which translates into lower participation rates, shorter 
working lives and poorer compensation levels. It is an equally well-known fact that pension 
systems generally try to remedy the consequences of women’s disadvantages for economic 
(in)security in old age with more generous provisions, specifically addressed to them. It is a 
third ‘stylised’ fact that recent pension reforms in Europe have accentuated the correlation 
between contributions and benefits and to some extent ‘individualised’ the system, by reducing 
the scope for derived rights, such as those that depend on being a spouse (widow).   
The first two facts reflect a social model that attributes different roles to women, regarded as the 
main providers of unpaid caring work, with respect to men; on the other hand, the third fact is 
the result of profound changes in that model and of the transition (which different countries 
have covered to differing extents) to a model that relies more on equality of opportunity and less 
on ex post compensations. In this model, caring activities are considered complementary, rather 
than accessory to, paid work in the job market (Fornero and Monticone, 2006). 
These changes cause major problems, and policy-makers have become increasingly aware of the 
gender-related issues embedded in pension systems. At the EU level, the common objective of 
“review[ing] pension provisions with a view to ensuring the principle of equal treatment 
between women and men” (European Commission, 2003, p. 83) was agreed upon at the 
European Council held in Laeken in December 2001, as a step towards the “modernisation of 
pension systems”, and is included in the open method of coordination among member states.  
The recent attention paid to these issues is partly a consequence of the introduction of notional 
defined contribution (NCD) pension schemes in Italy, Latvia, Poland and Sweden (but other EU 
countries are in the process of evaluating the possible introduction of similar reforms). Since 
they strictly link pension benefits to contributions and to life expectancy at retirement, these 
schemes are viewed as ‘less generous’, in particular with respect to individuals with 
disadvantaged working careers, and thus typically to women. More specifically, a gender 
perspective on European pension systems reveals a heterogeneous situation with different rules 
for pension credits, survivor’s benefits, annuitisation and retirement age, characterising both the 
more traditional Defined Benefit (DB) systems and the more recent Defined Contribution (DC) 
ones, a reflection of the several variants of the European welfare system.  
In this analysis, we evaluate the relative pension positions of men and women, under different 
characterisations of their respective working lives and pension designs. We consider both a DB 
and a DC scheme, and a few variants of their basic pension formula, each exemplifying a 2 | BELLONI & FORNERO, WITH MANELLO 
 
stylised normative framework. We first compare DB versus DC schemes, in order to assess their 
respective roles (in our specification) in determining the relative pension positions of men and 
women. We then look within each of the two schemes, and quantify the effectiveness of 
different provisions (such as pension credits for childbearing and childrearing, and different 
annuitisation rules for the DC scheme) in obtaining a more equal distribution of retirement 
resources between the genders.  
The main results can be summarised as follows. Not surprisingly, the working career is the most 
relevant factor in determining the relative retirement income of women with respect to men; 
pension systems can compensate but only up to a point. As for a comparison between DB and 
DC systems, taken without explicit redistributive measures (such as a minimum pension 
provision in the first and pension credits in the second) the latter can fare better than the former 
in providing a more equal distribution of retirement income between men and women, because 
it removes the greater return to steeper earnings profiles, more characteristic of men. The 
introduction of a minimum pension provision in the DB system improves the relative position of 
women with discontinuous or poor careers, while, in DC systems, a formal recognition of 
women’s care activities through pension credits seems less effective than neutralising their 
longer life expectancy in the determination of the pension benefits using unisex longevity 
tables.  
2. Methodology 
Our methodology is summarised in Figure 1. In order to establish a link with task 6.4.3 of the 
project, we consider two eurozones (EU-15 and EU-25), even though their characterisation only 
differs with respect to very few aspects (i.e. productivity, occupation and mortality). In order to 
capture the different positions of men and women in the labour market, we compare four 
stylised career patterns for women, against the benchmark of a unique pattern for men, with a 
further differentiation within each pattern as to the earning rate of growth (according to the level 
of education). Each combination of these dimensions defines a ‘simulation scenario’ 
(represented by the ovals in the figure). We then consider two stylised pension schemes – a DB 
and a DC system – and different variants of their basic formula. Each of these variants defines a 
‘normative framework’ (represented by the transparent rectangles in Figure 1). In the ‘base 
case’, a pension system with no specific provision directed at compensating the disadvantaged 
position of women in the labour market is considered. In the other normative frameworks, 
described in detail later on, specific rules addressed to women are introduced (“gender-equality 
improving normative change…” in Figure 1).  GENDER DIFFERENCES IN RETIREMENT INCOME AND PENSION POLICY | 3 
 
Figure 1. The methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For each scenario, each pension scheme and each normative framework, three indicators (listed 
in the grey rectangular forms) are computed: i) the woman/man pension ratio (P ratio); ii) the 
woman/man present value of benefits ratio (PVB ratio) and iii) the woman/man net present 
value ratio ( NPVR ratio). The first indicator is just a rough measure of women’s relative 
retirement income position; the second, which is a measure of pension wealth at retirement, also 
captures the effects of the gender differences in life expectancy at retirement; the third is a 
measure of the so-called “money’s worth” of the pension system, as it is based on a comparison 
between (the present value of) contributions and benefits (Geanakoplos, Mitchell and Zeldes, 
2000).  
Finally, we evaluate the indicators by providing two kinds of comparisons, as indicated by the 
black arrows: a) between pension schemes, i.e. DB versus DC in the same normative framework 
(horizontal arrows) and b) within the same scheme between different normative frameworks 
(vertical arrows).  
We stress that the model is microeconomic and works by representative agents, and therefore 
does incorporate little individual heterogeneity; accommodates only one composition effect (see 
note 1) and finally does not allow for feedback effects, as both labour supply and retirement are 
exogenous.  
2.1  Macroeconomic and labour market characterisation  
In order to capture the potential contribution of the new accessions to the relative retirement 
income of men and women, we perform simulations for two eurozones: EU-15 and EU-25. 
From our perspective, they differ in terms of their macroeconomic and demographic 
characteristics: the first is simply sketched by the current rates of growth of both employment 4 | BELLONI & FORNERO, WITH MANELLO 
 
and labour productivity (OECD, Statistical Compendium 2006/1); the second is summarised by 
age specific mortality rates.   
In our simplified model, the GDP growth rate is given by the sum of the growth rates of 
employment and labour productivity; both are exogenously given and constant over time, 
although they can differ across simulations. The average earnings growth of the economy is 
determined by labour productivity, and is relevant both for the implicit rate of return of the DC 
system and for the rate of increase of individual earnings, with a (small) variability among 
representative agents determined by seniority and education level. Inflation is not considered. 
Demographic features are also exogenous and are relevant only as far as their consequences on 
the individual pension wealth as well as on the transformation coefficients of DC schemes are 
concerned.  
As for the relative positions of men and women in the labour market, we define a few stylised 
working careers, consistent with the macroeconomic framework described. A stylised career is 
identified by a career pattern – which specifies its length and continuity and essentially depends 
on having children – and by the earnings rate of growth. The age of entry into the labour market 
is set at 23 for both men and women. Men are assumed to work full-time throughout their whole 
career and retire at 65.  
We consider 4 possible women’s career patterns (adapted from James et. al., 2003): 
a)  Full-time (F): the career pattern of this group is the same as men’s; these women do not 
have children and work full-time until retirement; 
b)  Full-time, part-time, full-time (F/P/F): the women in this group work full-time until the age 
of 25; part-time from this age to 37, during which period they bear and rear two children, 
one borne at age 25 and the other at age 28. At 37, they are back to full-time paid job until 
age 65, when they retire.  
c)  Full-time, part-time (F/P): the women in this group work full-time until 25, and part-time 
for the rest of their working life. This pattern is meant to capture not only the bearing and 
rearing of children (borne, as before, at 25 and at 28) but also, possibly, elderly care in the 
household.  
d)  Short career (S): the women in this group work full-time until 25, part-time until age 37 
(when they follow the typical maternity pattern) and then retire.   
As for individual earnings, we assume they depend on three factors: rate of growth of labour 
productivity, seniority and education. The first one, which defines the average wage growth, 
depends on the simulated EU-zone. The second one affects individual earnings in a very simple 
way: it only discriminates between continuous and discontinuous careers, attributing to the first 
ones a higher rate of growth of earnings.
1 
Education introduces a further differentiation both between and within genders, by attributing a 
higher earning rate of growth to higher educated workers. However, since in the present work 
we limit the comparison between men and women, the intra-gender inequality is not considered. 
It follows that careers as specified in pattern a) are identical, also as far as education is 
concerned, and the comparisons do not depend on it. For the other career patterns, instead, we 
                                                      
1 The rates of growth of individual earnings respect the following aggregate constraint: 
∑
=
=
= =
l h e
f m g
e g e g w g p g
,
,
, , π where  w g is the average rate of growth of individual earnings, π  the rate of 
growth of labour productivity, g is gender and e is education level. Ps are determined proportions of each 
group within the current labour force in EU.  GENDER DIFFERENCES IN RETIREMENT INCOME AND PENSION POLICY | 5 
 
present different simulations for higher and lower educated workers. This additional 
classification – which provides more heterogeneity in the rate of growth of individual earnings – 
allows for changes in the wage growth gap between genders according to education level. This 
difference is larger among higher educated workers.  
Combining career patterns and rates of growth on individual earnings, we end up with 7 stylised 
women’s careers. Considering both geographical entities (and in addition a ‘high productivity’ 
scenario), we finally obtain the simulation plan described in Table B.1 in Appendix B. 
Table 1. Macroeconomic assumptions and consequent rates of growth of individual earnings 
(% points) 
Growth rates:  EU15  EU25  High growth 
Labour productivity  0.93  1.1  2 
Employment 0.49  0.5  0.49 
Individual earnings:     
Men/women continuous career  0.93  1.1  2 
Men higher edu.  1.85  2.19  3.98 
Women higher edu. (discontinuous c.)  0.9  1.06  1.94 
Men lower edu.  0.8  0.95  1.72 
Women lower edu. (discontinuous c.)  0.3  0.35  0.65 
 
Figure 2. A graphical illustration of our comparisons 
 
2.2 Pension  systems  characterisation  
We consider two PAYGO schemes: a DB and a (N)DC. The DB pension benefit depends on the 
average wage of the last 5 years of work and on accrued seniority at retirement. We assume that, 
for women with particularly disadvantaged careers, the DB benefit is replaced by a minimum 
pension (equal to 60% of the entry wage). The DC pension is computed in two steps: first, the 
contributions paid throughout the working career are capitalised, year-by-year, at a rate equal to 6 | BELLONI & FORNERO, WITH MANELLO 
 
the GDP growth rate; second, at retirement the accrued fund is converted into a pension benefit 
by means of an age-specific transformation coefficient.
2 
We first evaluate how the poorer performance of women in the labour market – in terms of 
career pattern and compensation level – would result in lower pension outcomes (with respect to 
men’s), if the pension system did not provide specific rules addressed to women as for 
childbearing, childrearing and (only for the DC pension) annuitisation: no pension credits, 
single-head annuity, gender-specific transformation coefficient. This is our ‘base case’. We 
then consider a variant of this base case by including a minimum pension provision in the DB 
system, to capture its greater redistributive features with respect to the NDC system.  
We finally define alternative normative frameworks, by changing in turn one of the above 
mentioned rules of the base case. In particular, each case incorporates one of the following 
rules: 
•  Spells of childbearing and childrearing are considered for the calculation of pension rights, 
by means of a given number of months (or years) of pension credits for each child born. The 
following alternative cases are considered: 
a)  a 6-month maternity leave; 
b)  2 years for childbearing and childrearing; 
c)  4 years for childbearing and childrearing.
3 
•  A survivors’ component is incorporated into the computation of the transformation 
coefficients in the DC pension formula. 
•  Unisex transformation coefficients replace gender-specific ones when the DC pension is 
computed. 
The base case plus the changes define the normative frameworks shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Normative frameworks 
Transformation coefficient (DC only) 
Normative 
framework 
Notional contribution
(years) 
Social pension
(DB only)  Survivors'
component  Mortality rates 
Base  no  no  no  Gender specific 
Base + 1  no  yes  no  Gender specific 
Base + 2a  1  yes  no  Gender specific 
Base + 2b  4  yes  no  Gender specific 
Base + 2c  6  yes  no  Gender specific 
Base + 3  no  yes  yes  Gender specific 
Base + 4  no  yes  no  Unisex 
Base + 2b + 3  4  yes  yes  Gender specific 
Base + 2b + 3 + 4  4  yes  yes  Unisex 
                                                      
2 These coefficients depend on mortality rates and expected GDP growth (both changing across scenarios) 
and on other variables, such as gender and the inclusion of a survivors’ component (which define 
different normative frameworks). See Appendix A for further explanations. 
3 Cases a), b), and c) reflect the current normative rules in the UK, Luxembourg and Sweden respectively. 
In every case, pension credits entirely ‘cover’ the maternity leaves. We also assume that each additional 
year of credit can be spread over a period of two years, when the woman works part-time.   GENDER DIFFERENCES IN RETIREMENT INCOME AND PENSION POLICY | 7 
 
For each simulation scenario, pension scheme and normative framework, we finally compute 
the following indicators: 
•  woman/man pension ratio (P ratio); 
•  woman/man present value of benefits ratio (PVB ratio); 
•  woman/man net present value ratio (NPVR ratio), 
where the PVB ratio captures, in addition to the P ratio, the difference in life expectancy at 
retirement between genders. The NPVR ratio captures instead the overall generosity of the 
pension system (given that it takes into account the contributory history of the workers).
4 More 
details on the indicators can be found in Appendix A. 
3. Results 
Figures from 3 to 6 present the results of our simulations. In order to interpret them, we stress 
that our indicators are always representative of the relative position of women with respect to 
men; thus they do not tell anything in terms of the absolute level of pensions (for example, to 
establish a comparison to a poverty line) or in terms of  individual replacement ratios.  
Figure 3, which is relative to our base case, illustrates the basic fact that the relative pension 
position of women is determined by their relative position in the labour market. The different 
characterisations of pension systems are secondary factors. Women enjoying the same working 
pattern and the same compensation level ‘fare like men’ in the DB system as far as their pension 
benefit is concerned (the P ratio is equal to 1) and better than men in terms of pension wealth 
(given their lower mortality, their pension wealth is 1.20 times that of men). In the NDC system, 
given that the system incorporates life expectancy in the pension formulae, and that mortality 
tables are differentiated by gender, the situation is reversed: the pension-wealth ratio is equal to 
one, while the P ratio is 0.8 given women’s higher life expectancy.  
Moving to the right of the figure, we see that the relative occupational situation of women 
worsens. In the F/P/F career the pattern of differentiation among the indicators characterising 
the full career is maintained, although the level is lower, varying between 0.6 and 0.8. Moving 
further to the right, we see that indicators tend to level out: in the short career case all indicators 
are around 0.2.   
                                                      
4 For a description of these indicators (known as “money’s worth measures”) see e.g. Geanakoplos, 
Mitchell and Zeldes (2000). 8 | BELLONI & FORNERO, WITH MANELLO 
 
Figure 3. P ratios and PVB ratios for different women’s career patterns: EU-15, base case 
 (no social pension)  
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Notes: F is full-time, F/P/F is full-time, part-time, full-time, F/P is full-time, part-time, S is short career. 
Men are assumed to work full-time. Normative framework is base case. Scenario is EU-15, lower 
education. 
Source: Our calculations. 
The inclusion of a minimum pension provision – equal to one third of the average initial 
earnings – in the DB system (see Figure 4) leaves unchanged the relative position of the first 
two groups of women, as their work entitles them to more than the minimum benefit. For the 
other two groups, this provision significantly improves their relative position, taking them to 
around 0.5 for the P ratio, and 0.6 for the PVB ratio.   
Figure 4. P ratios and PVB ratios for different women’s career patterns: EU15, base case + 1 
(with social pension)  
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Notes: F is full-time, F/P/F is full-time, part-time, full-time, F/P is full-time, part-time, S is short career. 
Men are assumed to work full-time. Normative framework is base case + 1. Scenario is EU-15, 
lower education.  
Source: Our calculations. GENDER DIFFERENCES IN RETIREMENT INCOME AND PENSION POLICY | 9 
 
Figure 5 considers an enlarged Europe (EU-25), capturing essentially two features: a higher 
productivity growth and higher mortality rates. Both are almost irrelevant, which is not 
surprising, given: a) the very limited increase in the productivity growth; and b) that the higher 
mortality concerns both genders, leaving their relative position unchanged.  
Figure 5. P ratios and PVB ratios for different women’s career patterns: EU-25 
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Notes: F is full-time, F/P/F is full-time, part-time, full-time, F/P is full-time, part-time, S is short career. 
Men are assumed to work full-time. Normative framework is base case. Scenario is EU25, lower 
education.  
Source: Our calculations. 
In order to highlight the effects of higher growth we isolate this factor (Figure 6), by 
considering a rate of growth of labour productivity equal to 2%, instead of 0.9 (see Table 1). 
Against the benchmark of a full career, the more dynamic the economy, the more discontinuous 
are careers penalised, as shown by the worsening of the relative positions of women in Figure 6 
with respect to what is shown in Figure 3.  10 | BELLONI & FORNERO, WITH MANELLO 
 
Figure 6. P ratios and PVB ratios for different women’s career patterns: high productivity  
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Notes: F is full-time, F/P/F is full-time, part-time, full-time, F/P is full-time, part-time, S is short career. 
Men are assumed to work full-time. Normative framework is base case. Scenario is high 
productivity, lower education. 
Source: Our calculations. 
Among the policy measures we simulate, the most effective in improving the relative position of 
women is the introduction of unisex transformation coefficients in the NDC scheme (base + 4). 
Table B.3 in the Appendix, for example, shows how the P ratio and the PVB ratio increase by 
13 and 15% respectively as compared to the base case (from 0.61 to 0.74 and from 0.73 to 
0.88). We achieve this result only through our most generous assumption on pension credits, 
which allows for 6 years of notional contributions. In the other, less generous cases, the 
effectiveness of pension credits in improving the relative position of women is more limited. If 
6 months of pension credits for each child are granted, the P ratio and the PVB ratio only 
increase by around 2% both in the DB and in the NDC scheme.  
Finally, providing a survivors’ annuity in the NDC scheme (base + 3) increases the P ratio by 
11% (because the additional benefit is greater for men than for women) but it leaves the PVB 
ratio almost constant (the slight increase of 1% from 0.73 to 0.74 is due to the assumption that 
the discount rate is greater than the GDP growth rate). The survivors’ benefit is in fact fully 
‘paid’ by the main beneficiary, by means of an actuarially-reduced pension. On the contrary, 
providing survivors’ benefits in the DB scheme decreases the PVB ratio by 12% (for the same 
reason just mentioned).
5  
Results do not change (qualitatively, and very little quantitatively) across scenarios as well as 
across different career patterns.  
                                                      
5 Providing survivors’ benefits in the DB scheme generates an increase in the pension wealth of both men 
and women, because the pension is not actuarially corrected and contributions paid are unchanged. This 
policy is therefore not financially sustainable.  | 11 
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Appendix A: Model details 
Pensions formulae and measures of gender redistribution  
•  The DB formula is given by: 
X s X s X s sen w P , , , ⋅ ⋅ = α  
where: 
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w , sen is seniority at retirement, s the gender (m=male, f=female), X the 
retirement age, wthe wage and α the incremental benefit per year of seniority. 
  
•  The DC formula is given by: 
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where Ω is the lifespan,  X s, l  the survivors from 100.000 live births of gender s at age X, 
ved
X s, − l  
the probability for the widow(er) (of age X and gender –s) to marry again after the pensioner’s 
(of gender s) death,  s ε the age-difference between pensioner and widow (er) and Ψ the quota of 
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•  The woman/man pension ratio (P ratio) is given by: 
X m
X f
P
P
,
,  
•  The woman/man present value of benefits ratio (PVB ratio) is given by: 
X m
X f
PVB
PVB
,
,  
where 
X s
X s X s P PVB
,
, ,
1
δ
= , assuming in  δs,X that g
E=r and 
⎩
⎨
⎧ + + + + + +
= Ψ
otherwise          0
4 3 2b base   3, 2b base   3, base   is framework    normative           5 . 0 if
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•  The woman/man net present value ratio (NPVR ratio) is given by: 
X m
X f
NPVR
NPVR
,
,  where 
∑
=
− +
= X
i
i X
i s
X s
X s
r c
PVB
NPVR
15
,
,
,
) 1 (
 
 
Other model details and assumptions 
•  Mortality rates for EU15 are approximated by mortality rates of Germany. Mortality 
rates for EU25 are approximated by mortality rates of Czech Republic,  
•  g
E = g (static expectations on GDP growth), 
•  r is 2 percent, 
•  3 = s ε  if s = m,  3 − = s ε  if s = f, 
• 
ved
s x l , is approximated by Italian values (INPS, 1989). 
•  Notes: the indicators do not depend on α and γ, and vary only a little with respect to 
changes in r.  
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Appendix B: Simulation plan and detailed results  
Table B.1 Simulation plan  
working career  Simulation 
number  scenario 
education pattern 
1 EU  15  -  F 
2 EU-15  Lower  F/P/F 
3 EU-15  Higher  F/P/F 
4 EU-15  Lower  F/P 
5 EU-15  Higher  F/P 
6 EU-15  Lower  S 
7 EU-15  Higher  S 
8 EU-25  -  F 
9 EU-25  Lower  F/P/F 
10 EU-25  Higher  F/P/F 
11 EU-25  Lower  F/P 
12 EU-25  Higher  F/P 
13 EU-25  Lower  S 
14 EU-25  Higher  S 
15 High  prod.  - F 
16 High  prod.  Lower  F/P/F 
17 High  prod.  Higher  F/P/F 
18 High  prod.  Lower  F/P 
19 High  prod.  Higher  F/P 
20 High  prod.  Lower  S 
21 High  prod.  Higher  S 
Notes: F is full-time, F/P/F is full-time, part-time, full-time, F/P is full-time, part-time, S is short career.  
Table B.2 Simulation 1 
   Women/Men ratios 
 DB  DC 
Normative framework  P  PVB  NPVR    P  PVB  NPVR 
Base  1,00 1,20  1,20  0,83 0,99  0,99 
Base + 1  1,00 1,20  1,20  0,83 0,99  0,99 
Base + 2a  - -  -  - -  - 
Base + 2b  - -  -  - -  - 
Base + 2c  - -  -  - -  - 
Base + 3  1,00 1,02  1,02  0,98 1,00  1,00 
Base + 4  - -  -  1,00  1,20  1,20 
Base + 2b + 3  - -  -  - -  - 
Base + 2b + 3 + 4  - -  -    1,00  1,02  1,02 GENDER DIFFERENCES IN RETIREMENT INCOME AND PENSION POLICY | 15 
 
Table B.3 Simulation 2 
   Women/Men ratios 
 DB  DC 
Normative framework  P  PVB  NPVR    P  PVB  NPVR 
Base  0,69 0,82  1,13    0,61 0,73  1,00 
Base + 1  0,69 0,82  1,13  0,61 0,73  1,00 
Base + 2a  0,71 0,84  1,16  0,63 0,76  1,04 
Base + 2b  0,76 0,90  1,24  0,69 0,82  1,12 
Base + 2c  0,80 0,96  1,32  0,74 0,88  1,21 
Base + 3  0,69 0,70  0,96  0,72 0,74  1,01 
Base + 4  - -  -  0,74  0,88  1,21 
Base + 2b + 3  - -  -  0,81  0,83  1,13 
Base + 2b + 3 + 4  - -  -    0,82  0,84  1,16 
Table B.4 Simulation 3 
   Women/Men ratios 
 DB  DC 
Normative framework  P  PVB  NPVR    P  PVB  NPVR 
Base  0,58 0,69  1,02  0,56 0,67  1,00 
Base + 1  0,58 0,69  1,02  0,56 0,67  1,00 
Base + 2a  0,59 0,71  1,05  0,58 0,70  1,03 
Base + 2b  0,64 0,76  1,13  0,63 0,75  1,11 
Base + 2c  0,68 0,81  1,20  0,67 0,80  1,19 
Base + 3  0,58 0,59  0,88  0,67 0,68  1,01 
Base + 4  - -  -  0,68  0,81  1,20 
Base + 2b + 3  - -  -  0,74  0,75  1,12 
Base + 2b + 3 + 4  - -  -  0,75  0,77  1,14 
Table B.5 Simulation 4 
   Women/Men ratios 
 DB  DC 
Normative framework  P  PVB  NPVR    P  PVB  NPVR 
Base  0,42 0,50  1,07  0,39 0,47  0,98 
Base + 1  0,52 0,63  1,32  0,39 0,47  0,98 
Base + 2a  0,52 0,63  1,32  0,41 0,49  1,04 
Base + 2b  0,52 0,63  1,32  0,46 0,55  1,17 
Base + 2c  0,54 0,64  1,36  0,51 0,61  1,30 
Base + 3  0,52 0,54  1,13  0,46 0,47  0,99 
Base + 4  - -  -  0,47  0,56  1,19 
Base + 2b + 3  - -  -  0,55  0,56  1,18 
Base + 2b + 3 + 4  - -  -  0,56  0,57  1,20 16 | BELLONI & FORNERO, WITH MANELLO 
 
Table B.6 Simulation 5 
   Women/Men ratios 
 DB  DC 
Normative framework  P  PVB  NPVR    P  PVB  NPVR 
Base  0,36 0,42  0,99  0,35 0,42  0,98 
Base + 1  0,36 0,42  0,99  0,35 0,42  0,98 
Base + 2a  0,37 0,44  1,04  0,37 0,44  1,03 
Base + 2b  0,41 0,49  1,15  0,41 0,49  1,15 
Base + 2c  0,45 0,54  1,27  0,46 0,55  1,27 
Base + 3  0,36 0,36  0,85  0,42 0,42  0,99 
Base + 4  - -  -  0,42  0,51  1,18 
Base + 2b + 3  - -  -  0,49  0,50  1,16 
Base + 2b + 3 + 4  - -  -  0,50  0,51  1,19 
Table B.7 Simulation 6 
   Women/Men ratios 
 DB  DC 
Normative framework  P  PVB  NPVR    P  PVB  NPVR 
Base  0,14 0,17  0,80  0,17 0,20  0,92 
Base + 1  0,52 0,63  2,88  0,17 0,20  0,92 
Base + 2a  0,52 0,63  2,88  0,19 0,23  1,04 
Base + 2b  0,52 0,63  2,88  0,24 0,29  1,33 
Base + 2c  0,52 0,63  2,88  0,29 0,35  1,60 
Base + 3  0,52 0,54  2,46  0,20 0,20  0,93 
Base + 4  - -  -  0,20  0,24  1,11 
Base + 2b + 3  - -  -  0,28  0,29  1,34 
Base + 2b + 3 + 4  - -  -  0,29  0,30  1,36 
Table B.8 Simulation 7 
   Women/Men ratios 
 DB  DC 
Normative framework  P  PVB  NPVR    P  PVB  NPVR 
Base  0,10 0,12  0,67  0,14 0,17  0,91 
Base + 1  0,33 0,40  2,16  0,14 0,17  0,91 
Base + 2a  0,33 0,40  2,16  0,16 0,19  1,03 
Base + 2b  0,33 0,40  2,16  0,20 0,24  1,31 
Base + 2c  0,33 0,40  2,16  0,25 0,29  1,60 
Base + 3  0,33 0,34  1,85  0,17 0,17  0,92 
Base + 4  - -  -  0,17  0,20  1,10 
Base + 2b + 3  - -  -  0,24  0,24  1,32 
Base + 2b + 3 + 4  - -  -  0,24  0,25  1,35 
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